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Abstract—The increasing automation of business processes is
one of the main benefits of the ongoing technological evolution.
Regarding e-invoices this automation process is still not opti-
mally supported despite the fact that recent studies indicate
a high potential to save costs. Within this paper we identify
the main obstacles and propose a multi-stage solution. Therein
we classify the e-invoicing process using common security
objectives and, since the process includes many security related
elements, propose an initial solution based on security patterns.
The approach takes advantage of the main benefits of security
patterns to provide a domain-independent solution which is
built upon expert knowledge.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Invoice processing is a central part of the value chain of
almost any business. Therefore improvements may both have
a positive financial and performance impact. For example, a
recent study indicates a potential for savings up to 70 percent
for e-invoices [1] compared to paper-based invoices. Basi-
cally every invoice (e.g. in PDF format) sent by electronic
means may be considered an e-invoice. However there are
several legal, mental and technical obstacles that make e-
invoice processing a complex task.
According to [2] there are at least three main barriers
which hamper the comprehensive adoption of e-invoices:
• Legal uncertainty: For instance, until recently there
was no legal basis for e-invoicing in the European
Union [3]. Legislation amendments in many states
addressed this issue. However there is still a lot of
uncertainty due to the fact that requirements of multiple
legal domains overlap and need to be fulfilled.
• Lack of trust: The lack of trust in e-business solutions
becomes apparent by comparing the requirements for
paper-based and e-invoices. While the authenticity of
origin of paper-based invoices is often solely verified
on the basis of the letterhead, e-invoices mostly require
an advanced or qualified electronic signature, which
offers a significantly higher trustworthiness than paper
invoices.
• Missing standardisation: The multitude of available
specifications - partly proprietary - hampers both the
interoperability when exchanging e-invoices and the
establishment of an accepted standard. This applies
especially for cross-nation interactions, where different
legal requirements have to be considered.
It is evident that developing a consistent e-invoice solution
is a complex task. We propose a multi-stage process to
resolve the afore-mentioned obstacles. This includes the
partitioning of the e-invoice process and the classification
according to the core security objectives. Subsequently se-
curity patterns are assigned to each objective. Using security
patterns, we aim to overcome each of the difficulties. By
providing a domain-independent solution, security patterns
can help to construct a solution that abstracts from legal
requirements of a particular legal system. Furthermore a
solution built upon security patterns may be more trust-
worthy since security patterns embody expert knowledge
and usually patterns went through a public verification
process. Finally, the fact that security patterns are based
on well-proven, field-tested solutions may be beneficial for
standardisation. It has been demonstrated by Fernandez et
al. [4] that business solutions may benefit from a pattern
based approach.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Within section II we analyse the shortcomings of paper-
based invoices and outline a solution for e-invoicing. Prelim-
inary work for our approach is presented in section III and
IV. In section V we demonstrate the integration of security
patterns into the e-invoicing process. Section VI describes
related work and section VII concludes the paper with an
outlook on future work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
Despite the possibility of sending e-invoices many enter-
prises still rely on paper-based solutions. The default paper-
based invoicing process is depicted in figure 1. Thus the
invoice is created for instance using an ERP-Software like
Figure 1. Default paper-based invoicing process
SAP and afterwards printed on paper. After postal delivery
the receiver scans the invoice to re-digitalise it and uses
an OCR-Software to extract relevant information. Usually
both the paper-based invoice and the digitalised invoice are
stored.
It is obvious that this solution has several shortcomings.
First both printing and scanning cause media breaks which
are prone to error since the invoice layout is not standardised
and therfore it is hard to automatically extract all the rele-
vant details using OCR-Software. Furthermore this solution
increases costs by providing the hardware infrastructure and
by having to pay for postal delivery. Additionally sending the
invoice by mail is much more time-consuming than sending
it by electronic means.
To overcome these shortcomings and to arrive at an
interoperable secure e-invoice we propose a multi-stage
solution which is depicted in figure 2. Therein the first steps
are to partition the e-invoicing process into logical units
and to select appropriate security objectives from an eligible
security standard (e.g. ISO 27001:2005 [5]). Afterwards we
apply the selected security objectives to the partitioned e-
invoicing process in order to get a classification scheme. This
is used to examine which security objectives are relevant for
each unit of the partitioned e-invoice process.
As explained in section I, our solution is based on security
patterns. Therefore it is necessary to classify the security pat-
terns using the afore-mentioned security objectives. This step
is essential to combine the e-invoicing process with security
patterns. When integrating both concepts, each security
objective in the classification scheme that is required for a
process unit is replaced by appropriate security patterns that
fulfil this objective. Furthermore this extended classification
scheme enables us to derive a pattern language (see figure 2),
i.e. a consistent solution that illustrates not only the security
patterns used but also the relations between those patterns.
However due to space constraints those two final steps are
not presented in this paper and are left out to future work.
III. E-INVOICE PROCESS PARTITIONING AND
CLASSIFICATION
The paper was motivated by the fact that the default e-
invoice process is a complex task that is hampered by several
obstacles. Since it is easier to address subproblems, simpli-
fying the e-invoicing task is essential for the development
of a consistent solution. Therefore we propose to partition
the process at a high level of abstraction as follows.
• Creation: Refers to the process of creating a valid
e-invoice. This includes measures to ensure a secure,
auditable creation process as well as the protection of
the integrity and the authenticity of the origin of an
e-invoice.
• Exchange: Refers to the process of sending, trans-
mitting and receiving e-invoices and the affected core
security objectives.
Figure 2. Approach of integrating security patterns into the e-
invoicing process
• Storage: Refers to the process of persistently storing
an e-invoice and all attachments that are required to
verify the integrity and the authenticity of the origin of
an e-invoice.
Since this is a rather high-level classification, the security
objectives assigned to one process unit may also have an
impact on parts of further process units. For instance, ac-
countability requirements may apply to the creation process
and furthermore when sending an invoice which is part of the
exchange process, while accountability may not be required
for the transmission.
After partitioning the e-invoice process we propose to
classify each group to refine the security requirements
and subsequently being able to assign security patterns to
each requirement. This paper focuses on addressing security
related issues of the e-invoicing process and therefore we
propose the classification following the ISO 27001:2005
standard [5].
Table I illustrates the classified e-invoicing process. Thus
the e-invoice creation has to fulfil several requirements.
Authenticity must be ensured (e.g. by signing the invoice
using an electronic signature). Furthermore integrity needs
to be guaranteed to prevent - accidentally or intentionally
- modified documents to be sealed and sent. Additionally
accountability is needed to meet legal requirements.
The exchange process can be classified as follows. If
the e-invoice is transmitted using an insecure or public
communication channel (e.g. the internet) confidentiality
may be endangered. Furthermore appropriate measures must
be applied to be able to ensure integrity. It is also necessary
to verify the authenticity of the document and to be able to
proof the origin of a message (non-repudiation).
Because of legal requirements each invoice must be kept
for a specific period of time, for example ten years in
Germany. This implies that for the storage process, several
Creation Exchange (send, transmit,
receive, verify)
Storage
Confidentiality (x) (x)
Integrity x x x
Availability x
Authenticity x x x
Non-repudiation x
Accountability x (x)
x: is required (x): may be required
Table I
E-INVOICE PROCESS CLASSIFICATION
security objectives are relevant. First an enterprise may
want to ensure the confidentiality of the stored invoices.
Furthermore it is important to ensure integrity of the stored
documents (e.g. e-invoice and related signature) for the
whole storage period. Due to legal requirements it is also
necessary to maintain the availability of the storage system,
e.g. for VAT audits. These requirements also imply that the
authenticity of an invoice needs to be verifiable for the whole
storage period. Furthermore it may be necessary to consider
accountability requirements.
IV. CLASSIFYING SECURITY PATTERNS USING SECURITY
OBJECTIVES
To combine security patterns with the e-invoicing process,
it is required to classify security patterns using the same
classifiers as applied to the invoicing process. The classifi-
cation scheme developed in section III provides the basis for
the integration of security patterns. Security patterns usually
contribute to fulfil one security objective. They may however
influence the achievement of other security objectives, but
analysing these side effects is out of scope of this paper and
part of our future work.
The first step is to analyse the body of security patterns
and to categorise the relevant patterns according to the
security objectives determined in section III. However this is
not a trivial task because there are several books [6][7] and
multiple repositories to screen for relevant security patterns
and a complete catalogue is still missing. Furthermore
the common templates (e.g. the POSA [8] and the GOF
[9] template), that are used to structure patterns, lack an
indication of the security objectives a pattern addresses. To
resolve these shortcomings, several approaches have been
published. In [10] the development of a wiki based pattern
catalogue is proposed to ease the identification of relevant
patterns. In order to resolve the problem of relating security
patterns to security objectives Yskout et al. [11] propose
to extend existing pattern templates to include information
about affected security objectives.
On the analogy of [12] we surveyed 215 security patterns
published in 36 pattern catalogues. For classification, we
adapted the scheme proposed in [11] to fit our needs.
Figure 3. Security pattern classification scheme following [11]
Furthermore, few core security objectives have been com-
bined to more generic classes, since several security patterns
address a more general security objective that can hardly
be mapped to only one security objective (e.g. the single
sign-on delegator pattern [6] is beneficial for both the
identification, authentication and authorisation process as
well for the availability of those services). The consequence
of this classification is that some categories overlap and de-
pendencies emerge. Those effects have also been recognized
in [11].
Figure 3 illustrates the classification scheme. To better fit
the security patterns’ orientation, the scheme consists of an
”aggregated” objective (Controlled Access), a ”specialised”
objective (Secure Data Transmission) and the common se-
curity objectives. The fact, that the scheme contains more
security objectives than used in section III to classify the
e-invoicing process is because invoicing does not affect all
objectives (e.g. privacy) but a complete scheme was required
to classify all security patterns. The relations between those
objectives are also depicted in figure 3. Those relations
become useful when deriving a pattern language for e-
invoicing since a pattern fulfilling one objective may have
a positive or negative effect on the adaptability of patterns
from another category.
V. INTEGRATING SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY
PATTERNS
After the preliminary work in section III and section IV,
this section describes the integration of security patterns into
the e-invoicing process.
To map security patterns to a process unit (e.g. exchange)
and a security objective (e.g. integrity) it is required to create
a set of security patterns that contribute to fulfil this security
objective and carefully review all patterns within this set.
However due to the generic character of security objectives,
only some of the patterns of this set are applicable while the
others fulfil the security objective within another context.
For instance, the Virtual Address Space Access Control
pattern [13] is both beneficial for integrity and confidentiality
but applies to a different domain (operating systems) and
is therefore not adaptable to ensure the integrity or the
confidentiality of an e-invoice.
Table II illustrates the integration of security patterns into
the e-invoicing process. Due to space constraints we have
exemplary chosen three fields from the whole classification
matrix. The first field contains security patterns that are
beneficial for the integrity within the creation process of
an e-invoice. Due to the generic classification scheme, the
integrity can refer to different domains within the creation
process (e.g. it may refer to the process of ensuring the
integrity of the invoice to avoid signing accidentally or
intentionally modified documents but it may also refer to
the integrity of the signature creation device). Therefore in
table II there are multiple patterns which contribute to fulfil
the security objective integrity.
The same applies for accountability within the e-invoice
storage process. While some of the patterns refer to the
accountability of an incident to a system (secure logger [6]),
others aim to improve the accountability of an incident to a
person (share responsibility for security [14]). Furthermore it
can be seen that there are overlapping patterns. For instance,
the log for audit [14] and the three-point logging [15]
pattern have a similar intention, which requires to choose
one alternative when deriving a pattern language.
The assignment process also revealed a strong relation
between non-repudiation and authenticity. If a security pat-
tern ensures the authentiticy of a message this often implies
that the non-repudiation requirements are also fulfilled. For
example, the sender authentication [16] pattern requires to
sign a message using a private key. Verifying this signature
using the public key implies the authentiticy of the message
and makes it impossible for the sender to deny the authorship
of the message.
There are serveral notable points that became evident
when assigning security patterns to the e-invoicing process.
First each field of the classification matrix contains multiple
security patterns. This enables us to keep the solution
independent from a concrete implementation. For instance,
there are patterns that ensure integrity using a modification
detection code while others rely on electronic signature.
A decision for a concrete implementation has to be made
when deriving a pattern language for e-invoicing using this
classification scheme.
Process: Creation
Security objective: Integrity
Authorative Source Of Data
Client Input Filters
Input Guard
Message Integrity
Certificate Authority
Certificate Revocation
Key In The Pocket
Process: Storage
Security objective: Accountability
Continual Status Reporting
Three-point Logging
Audit Interceptor
Log For Audit
Secure Logger
Share Responsibility For Security
Process: Exchange
Security objective: Non-repudiation
Secrecy With Signature
Message Authentication
Sender Authentication
Table II
INTEGRATION OF SECURITY PATTERNS INTO THE
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
Furthermore there were a few fields in the matrix where
we could hardly find appropriate security patterns but only
a few that address only parts of the problem or contribute
to fulfil a security objective as a side effect while having its
main focus on another objective. This is a strong indicator
for missing patterns. For example, most patterns within
the storage process that contribute to the security objective
integrity relate to the integrity of the system but it is hard
to find appropriate patterns for message integrity. Moreover
in some cases it is necessary to combine several security
patterns to fulfil a security objective. Accountability is a
good example for this case. To implement a comprehensive
logging solution both the audit interceptor [6] pattern and
the secure logger [6] pattern are required. While the former
enables us to be noticed of all important events the later
provides functionality for storing the information in a way
so that it cannot be modified.
VI. RELATED WORK
Having a suitable classification scheme is essential to find
the right pattern. While we used security objectives for the
classification, several other schemes have been proposed.
Most of them are based on manual classification (see [17] for
a comprehensive overview), however there are approaches to
classify patterns automatically [18] [19].
Using security patterns to develop secure applications
is an active research area. Several approaches have been
proposed to integrate security patterns into the development
lifecycle. [20] presents an approach which is based on an
UML extension, called UMLSec. Braz et al. propose an
approach which is based on threat modeling and misuse
activities [21].
VII. CONCLUSION
Within this paper we identified the main obstacles that
hamper a comprehensive application of e-invoices. We pro-
posed a solution based on a security objective classification
scheme that takes advantage of the domain-independence
and the expert knowledge of security patterns. Therein we
demonstrated that a combination of security patterns and
security objectives proposed by Yskout et al. [11] is possible.
However the classification scheme has a few shortcomings
mostly due to its generic nature. Therefore our future work
includes the analysis of more fine-grained classification
schemes that create smaller categories and hence enable a
better assignment of security patterns. This also facilitates
a better identification of issues that are not yet covered by
appropriate security patterns. We also plan to integrate threat
analyis and misuse cases to further refine out approach [21].
Futhermore we aim to derive a pattern language from the
classification scheme to show a concrete solution for the
e-invoicing process. This also includes analysing the depen-
dencies and relations between patterns since the application
of one security pattern may hamper the applicability of
another pattern.
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